SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases of
interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal
community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in
significant areas of Third Circuit practice.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Toxic

SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACTADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DID NOT ABUSE DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE'S

ORDER

ASSESSING

FINES

WHERE

IMPORTER

FAILED TO PROVIDE PROPER CERTIFICATION IN VIOLATION OF
REGULATION

PROMULGATED

PURSUANT

TO THE TOXIC SUB-

ACT-ALM Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, Region 11, 974 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1992).
STANCES CONTROL

Between late 1985 and the fall of 1986, petitioner ALM Corporation (ALM) imported nine shipments of synthetic pellets.
974 F.2d at 382. These pellets, made of nylon and other plastic
materials, were used in the production of consumer goods. Id.
Nineteen Code of Federal Regulations § 12.121 requires an importer of chemical substances to certify either that its shipment is
not subject to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA or Act),
or that its shipment is subject to and complies with the Act. Id. at
384. In addition, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2614 makes it unlawful for an
importer to fail to file reports required under TSCA or any rule
promulgated thereunder. Id. None of ALM's shipments were accompanied by the proper certification. Id. at 382.
ALM's first shipment, on October 10, 1985, had neither a
certificate stating that it complied with TSCA nor that it was not
subject to TSCA. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
upon learning of this defect, issued a notice of noncompliance to
ALM. Thereafter, ALM imported six more shipments. These
shipments, also lacked the necessary certification. In response,
on June 23, 1986, the EPA issued a complaint, a compliance order and a notice of opportunity for hearing. Id. Two more ALM
shipments arrived in August, 1986. This time, ALM certified that
the shipments were not subject to TSCA. Id. The EPA amended
its complaint to allege that all nine shipments were imported in
violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 2614. Id. The complaint further alleged that ALM falsely certified that two of its shipments were
not subject to TSCA. Id. The amended complaint suggested a
total penalty of $54,000, or $6,000 for each violation. Id.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the EPA's
cross-motion for accelerated disposition on the question of
ALM's liability. Id. First, the judge found that the pellets were
chemical substances subject to TSCA. Id. Therefore, the judge
concluded, the failure to certify the shipments pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 12.121 was a violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 2614(3)(B). Id.

792

SURVEY

793

The judge also ruled that the EPA had authority to enforce civil
penalties assessable under 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615 for violation of 19
C.F.R. § 12.121. Id. In a separate hearing, the ALJ assessed a
$2500 penalty for each shipment imported without certification
and $1000 for each imported with improper certification, for a
total of $19,500. Id. at 382-83.
On appeal to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Administrator), ALM raised three issues. Id. at
383. First, ALM claimed that the certification required under 19
C.F.R. § 12.121 does not constitute a report within the meaning
of 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2614 and 2615. Id. Consequently, ALM offered, failure to file a certification of compliance does not constitute a failure to report in violation of TSCA. Id. Next, ALM
claimed that the EPA had no authority to enforce 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.121 because it was a customs regulation. Id. Finally, noting
that the importation of the pellets did not in itself violate TSCA,
ALM claimed that it should have had the opportunity to cure the
defect, as is permitted by the customs regulations. Id. Nevertheless, on October 11, 1991, the Administrator affirmed the ALJ's
decision. Id. ALM petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit for review of the Administrator's decision.
Id.
Judge Hutchinson, writing for the circuit court, denied the
petition. Id. at 386. Giving great deference to the administrative
agency, the court explained that the decision should be set aside
only where there exists an abuse of discretion. Id. at 383. Judge
Hutchinson stated that the Administrator reasonably interpreted
TSCA to mean that 15 US.C.A. § 2614(3)(B) incorporates the
certification requirement of 19 C.F.R. § 12.121. Id. at 385. Further, the court found that the EPA could assess civil penalties
even though regulation 19 C.F.R. § 12.121 provides that the customs official's remedy is to detain noncomplying imports. Id. at
386. In sum, the court concluded that the Administrator's interpretation of TSCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder
were reasonable. Id. at 385-86.
The court began its analysis by overviewing TSCA and its
relevant regulations. Id. at 383. Judge Hutchinson noted that
TSCA was enacted to "regulate and provide for federal oversight" of the manufacture and import of chemical substances. Id.
at 383-84 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601). The court reasoned that,
because it is physically and practically impossible for the Customs
Service to discover every customs violation at the point of entry,
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importers must take responsibility to police themselves by certifying shipments. Id. at 385. Additionally, the court explained, an
adequate enforcement procedure is essential when violations are
discovered after the substances have entered the country and left
the point of entry. Id. at 385-86.
The court noted several provisions in TSCA and the regulations that help to execute these goals. First, the judge noted that
15 U.S.C.A. § 2614 deems it unlawful for an importer to refuse
to file reports required by TSCA or any rule promulgated thereunder. Id. at 384. Next, the court stated that 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615
provides that any person who violates 15 U.S.C.A. § 2614 shall
be liable for civil penalties assessable by the EPA in an administrative order. Id. Finally, the court noted, 19 C.F.R. § 12.121,
which requires an importer of a chemical substance to file a certification at the port of entry with each shipment, was enacted pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Administrator under 15 U.S.C.A. § 2612 to issue regulations to enforce TSCA. Id.
After considering the plain language of TSCA, the court rejected ALM's argument that the required certification did not
constitute a "report" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 2614.
Id. at 385. Judge Hutchinson found persuasive the EPA's argument that common sense dictates that, because 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.121 is titled "Reporting requirements," the requested information would therefore be considered a "report." Id. While admitting that other interpretations were possible, the court upheld
as reasonable the Administrator's finding that the term "reports"
was to be read broadly to include certifications. Id. The court
also noted that the certification requirement was a rule promulgated under TSCA pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 2612(b). Id. Consequently, the court held that "reports" under 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2614 included certifications required pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
§ 12.121. Id.
Judge Hutchinson next addressed ALM's claim that the EPA
had no authority to enforce the certification requirement because
the regulation stated that noncomplying shipments were subject
to detainment by customs officials. Id. at 385. The court noted
that 19 C.F.R. § 12.122 indeed empowers the Customs Service to
detain shipments that lack the required certification. Id. The
court stated, however, that neither TSCA nor the code explicitly
stated or implied that detainment constituted the exclusive remedy for a violation of the regulation. Id.
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The court explained that if the detainment procedure carried out by the Customs Service was the only remedy for violation of the certification requirement, noncomplying importers
would never be subject to civil penalties. Id. at 386. In fact, the
court noted, a policy statement issued by the EPA in 1980 evidenced the agency's intent that the EPA's and the Custom Service's remedies not be mutually exclusive. Id. The court
acknowledged the relevant language, " '[i]f an imported shipment does not comply with the Act, EPA will seek appropriate
remedies.... These sanctions are in addition to those which may
independently be prescribed for violation of the [Customs Service's regulations].' " Id. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 79726 (1980)).
The court again declined to upset the Administrator's decision,
stating that it was reasonable for the Administrator to conclude
that the Custom Service's power to enforce 19 C.F.R. § 12.122
by detaining noncomplying shipments co-existed with the EPA's
power to assess civil penalties under 15 US.C.A. § 2615. Id.
Finally, the court, restating TSCA's goal to regulate and provide for federal oversight, noted that ALM's failure to certify its
shipments defeated the self-regulating element of the Act. Id. at
386. Similarly, the court rejected ALM's argument that its violations were harmless and it should have been allowed to cure
them. Id. A contrary holding, the court reasoned, would encourage noncompliance and eviscerate the Act. Id.
In denying the petition for review, the court correctly gave
great deference to the administrative agency's decision and interpretation of the Act. No party alleged that ALM's shipments
were not in compliance with TSCA. In upholding the Administrator's decision, the court seemed determined to preserve
TSCA's import and vigor. The court's decision places importers
on notice that they will not be able to "slide by" even when they
comply with TSCA but fail to certify that fact; nor will they be
able to cure after being caught trying. Accordingly, the Third
Circuit's decision can only help the EPA and the Customs Service
meet the goals of TSCA and enforce the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Cynthia Beagles
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ERISA-SEVERANCE PLAN-LABOR UNION'S SEVERANCE PLAN Is A
WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN WITHIN THE SCOPE OF

NON-VESTED

ERISA

AND

EMPLOYEE NOT ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE PAY

UPON TERMINATION OF PLAN-Deibler v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1992).
In November, 1968, appellant, the Executive Board of
United Food and Commercial Workers' Local Union 590, established a severance plan for union officials. 973 F.2d at 207. The
plan paid one week's salary for each year of employment with a
twenty-five year limit. In 1972, the union set aside funds to finance the severance benefit plan by converting the capital from a
strike fund to a severance fund.
The severance plan was subsequently modified after Local
590 merged with several other local unions to form Local 23 (Local 23 or Union). Id. at 207-08. Except for some minor changes,
the modified plan maintained the original plan's provisions. Id.
at 208. Shortly after the modifications, Local 23 suffered economic difficulties and the Union consequently issued a resolution
terminating the severance policy and allocating any remaining
severance pay money to the Union's general operating fund.
Less than one year after the modification, appellee Harold
Deibler, a union officer who had served for nearly nineteen years,
was demoted and then discharged from Local 23. The Union asserted that Deibler's discharge resulted from willful misconduct.
The allegations, however, were presented to and subsequently
dismissed by the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Board.
After the Union terminated the severance plan, but prior to
appellee's discharge, Deibler attempted to obtain a commitment
from Local 23 for severance pay. Local 23 denied Deibler's request. Deibler reasserted his request for severance upon his termination, and the Union again refused. The second refusal
prompted Deibler to file suit against Local 23 in federal district
court, under § 502 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), contending improper denial of severance benefits. The district court determined that the Union's
severance plan constituted a benefit plan within the scope of
ERISA. Id. In addition, the district court found that because the
Unemployment Compensation Board detected no willful misconduct surrounding Deibler's termination, Local 23 could not contend that Deibler left for an invalid reason. Id. at 208-09.
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Accordingly, the district court entered a judgment against Local
23 requiring payment of severance pay, attorney fees and costs.
Id. at 209.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted certification to consider whether the district court had
properly interpreted and applied the ERISA statute, and reversed the district court's judgment. Id. at 212. The appellate
court determined that, although the severance policy constituted
a benefit plan within the scope of ERISA, the plan was lawfully
terminated prior to Deibler's dismissal. Id. The court thus concluded that Deibler was not entitled to severance pay. Id.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Stapleton first articulated the two types of benefit plans recognized under ERISA employee welfare plans and employee pension plans. Id. at 209
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988)). Judge Stapleton observed
that the statute included severance benefits within the definition
of welfare benefit plans. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c),
1002(1)(B) (1988)). The court also noted that welfare plans are
subject to fiduciary standards and reporting and disclosure requirements under ERISA. Id.
The court then addressed Local 23's preliminary argument
that ERISA was not at issue because its severance policy did not
constitute a plan under the ERISA statute. Id. Acknowledging
that the statute itself does not define "plan," Judge Stapleton relied on circuit court precedent to conclude that the employer's
intent to provide regular and long-term benefits was the crucial
element in determining whether a plan existed. Id. (citing
Wickman v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st

Cir. 1990)). Specifically, the judge remarked, the accepted test
was whether the surrounding circumstances allowed a reasonable
person to " 'ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and procedures for receiving
benefits.' " Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367,

1373 (11 th Cir. 1982)). The court premonished, however, that
whether a plan is within the parameters of ERISA is a question of
fact, and the Third Circuit would reverse only if the district
court's decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at 209-10 (citation
omitted).
Applying the analysis established in Donovan to the case at
bar, the Third Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that Local
23 had instituted an ERISA plan. Id. at 210. The appellate court
addressed the first and second elements of the Donovan test. Id.
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Judge Stapleton found that the Union's minutes from its 1968
meeting, during which the Union established the severance policy, indicated an intent to pay severance funds to retiring union
officers. Id. The judge added that calculation of severance,
based upon the number of years employed, evinced a clear standard to ascertain the amount of the severance pay. Id.
Turning to the last two factors of the Donovan test, the court
observed that no express provision designated either a source of
financing or a procedure for acquiring benefits. Id. The judge
concluded, however, that a reasonable person could ascertain,
from surrounding circumstances, that severance pay claims were
to be presented to the Union President. Id. Moreover, Judge
Stapleton found it obvious that the Union would have paid the
benefits out of its general fund or a separately designated fund.
Id. Judge Stapleton stated that several union officials' applications for and receipt of severance pay, by such means and prior
to the policy's termination, aptly buttressed the court's finding.
Id.
After concluding that Local 23's severance policy was a bona
fide welfare plan under ERISA, the court examined whether the
Union lawfully terminated its severance plan. Id. Judge Stapleton asserted that if the termination was valid, then Deibler would
be ineligible to receive severance benefits because the Union discontinued the plan before Deibler's right to it vested. Id. The
court acknowledged that welfare benefit plans may be terminated
as long as the procedure is consistent with ERISA. Id. (citations
omitted). Judge Stapleton explained that amendment or discontinuance of welfare benefits did not violate fiduciary obligations,
because such action is purely a business decision. Id. The court
stated, however, that such amendment or termination must be
clearly manifested. Id. (citation omitted). Reviewing the Union's
1984 resolution, the judge found that it demonstrated an unmistakable intent to terminate the Union's severance policy. Id.
The court conceded that appellee had not challenged the
substance or procedure surrounding the policy's termination. Id.
The court noted that Deibler instead contended that Local 23
was obligated to pay severance, regardless of the resolution to
terminate, because the plan had been funded. Id. at 211.
Deibler, the court continued, posited that once a welfare plan is
funded, the assets must be disbursed to participants, and could
not revert to the employer. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(d)(2)
and 1103(c) (1988)).
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The appellate court reviewed the ERISA provisions upon
which Deibler relied, and rejected his argument. Id. The court
stated that Deibler inaccurately interpreted the statute to mandate that welfare plan assets may not revert to an employer under
any circumstance. Id. Judge Stapleton concluded that, contrary
to Deibler's assertion, an exception to the reversion prohibition
existed. Id. The court explained that under the exception any
excess funds could revert to the employer if all eligible plan participants had been paid. Id. (citing Chait v. Bernstein, 835 F.2d
1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1987)). In addition to this exception, Judge
Stapleton explained that ERISA allows an employer the opportunity to reduce or eliminate non-vested benefits at any time. Id.
(citations omitted). The court declared that, because of the ability to terminate at any time non-vested plans, and because welfare plans are expressly exempted from vesting requirements
under ERISA, Deibler, as a non-vested participant, would not be
entitled to severance pay. Id. at 211-12. The court determined
that Deibler would not have been vested until his discharge, and
that the discharge occurred only after the Union discontinued its
severance plan. Id. at 212. Furthermore, the judge explained,
the reversion of the surplus assets from the plan to the Union was
valid. Id.
In Deibler, the Third Circuit properly recognized that ERISA
benefits may be terminated and may revert back to an employer's
general operating fund. Judge Stapleton reached this conclusion
by correctly identifying the exception to ERISA's general prohibition against reversion. Moreover, the Third Circuit also recognized Congress's underlying intent to encourage employers to
adopt benefits without fear of being forced to maintain a plan
when experiencing financial difficulty.
Conversely, the appellate court's failure to recognize the
plight of the employee is disquieting. The court's attempt to vindicate Congress's intent to encourage benefit plans effectively
abandons the employee. The result may be that, after many
years of hard work, dedication and service, employees are denied
the very benefits that perhaps sustained their desire to remain
with the employer. Creation of severance plans that might be
revoked prior to an employee's retirement defeats Congress's ultimate attempt to provide employee benefits.
One solution would be to encourage the institution of benefit plans that are mindful of the employee. For example, requiring benefits to vest after a certain length of service, but prior to
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retirement, would fulfill the dedicated employee's expectations
while allowing the employer to opt for reversion of the nonvested benefits. Although this alternative may not encourage as
many plans, it is a compromise that contemplates both employer
flexibility and employee protection.
Marcia Ann Miller

ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGESCRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION-WHEN REVIEWING MAGISTRATE'S
CONCLUSION THAT CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION DOES NOT ANNUL PRIVILEGE, DISTRICT COURT CAN ONLY CONSIDER EVI-

DENCE THAT WAS BEFORE MAGISTRATE, MUST PROVIDE PARTY
DEFENDING PRIVILEGE AN OPPORTUNITY To BE HEARD, AND
MUST KEEP DISPUTED DOCUMENTS PRIVATE UNTIL ALL AVENUES OF APPEAL ARE EXHAUSTED;

To

MAINTAIN APPEARANCE

OF IMPARTIALITY ON REMAND, CASE MUST BE ASSIGNED TO
ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT JUDGE-Haines v. Liggett Group,

Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
In 1984, respondent Susan Haines, as the administratrix of
deceased Peter F. Rossi's estate, filed a personal injury action
against petitioners, numerous leading tobacco companies, alleging conspiracy, product liability and tort. 975 F.2d at 84-85.
Rossi, a smoker for forty years, was allegedly injured by what

Haines claims was an organized withholding and concealment
from the general public of potential health hazards associated
with tobacco use. Id. at 84-85, 98.
Four years later, Haines served her third discovery request
upon petitioners, seeking documents she believed would demonstrate that a council created by several cigarette manufacturers,
ostensibly to conduct independent research regarding potential
smoking-related risks, was actually engaged in funding research
to eviscerate the links between smoking and disease. Id. at 85.
Pursuant to this request, petitioners eventually produced more
than 2000 responsive documents, but withheld approximately
1500 other documents, claiming they were privileged as attorney-client communications or as work product. Id.
Haines argued that even if the documents were privileged,
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any privilege was negated by the crime-fraud exception. Id. at
86. Under the exception, communications made to obtain advice
for the commission of a crime or fraud are not protected. Id. at
84. Haines claimed that the documents in issue were communications regarding the ongoing fraudulent concealment of smoking-related risks. Id. at 86.
Thereafter, the district court appointed a special master to
consider whether the documents were privileged. Id. At the parties' request, the special master sent numerous documents, believed to be relevant to the crime-fraud exception issue, to a
magistrate judge for consideration. Id. The magistrate judge
concluded that Haines had not shown that the privilege, if found
to exist, should be annulled. Id. Based upon the magistrate's
finding, the special master then filed a Report and Recommendation concluding that of the 1,500 documents withheld, all but
eight were privileged. Id. at 87.
Haines appealed the magistrate's conclusion that the exception did not apply to the district court. Id. On appeal, the district
court ordered petitioners to produce relevant materials from another case they were defending, Cipollone, which they did under
objection. Id. Petitioners asserted that these materials were
outside of the record considered by the magistrate and thus
should not be considered, especially without allowing them an
opportunity to be heard. Id. The district court concluded that
respondent presented prima facie evidence that petitioners committed fraud, and held that the crime-fraud exception applied to
some of the documents, and that the contrary conclusion by the
magistrate was clearly erroneous. Id. at 88 (citing Haines v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 692 (D.N.J. 1992)).
The district court supported its findings by quoting excerpts
from five of the documents previously found to be privileged. Id.
(citing Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 695-96). The district court adopted
the special master's determination that all but eight of the documents were privileged, and ordered that the unprivileged documents be provided to respondent; also, the district court
reversed the magistrate's order, found that the exception applied
to those documents quoted in its opinion, and ordered that a
special master decide whether any of the remaining documents
were subject to the exception. Id. (citations omitted).
Insofar as the district court's order dealt only with this discovery issue, its decision was not immediately appealable. Id. at
83 (citation omitted). Petitioners therefore filed a petition for a
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writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
the district court stayed its order pending review. Id. at 83, 88.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court's
conclusion applying the crime-fraud exception was based on an
improper consideration of evidence not before the magistrate.
Id. at 88-94. Additionally, the court found that after respondent
made her initial showing of prima facie evidence supporting the
crime-fraud exception, petitioners should have been given an opportunity to be heard, and that the documents in question should
have been kept private until all appeals had been exhausted. Id.
at 94-97. Finally, the panel determined that to maintain the appearance of impartiality at the eventual trial after remand, the
case must be reassigned to another district court judge. Id. at 9798.
Writing for the appeals panel, Judge Aldisert considered
whether petitioners had satisfied the two prerequisites for an issuance of a writ of mandamus. Id. at 89 (citations omitted). With
respect to the first requirement-that the party requesting the
writ possess no other adequate means of obtaining relief-Judge
Aldisert found that because the district court's order releasing
some of the documents was not in any other way appealable, the
writ was petitioners' only recourse. Id. The judge further found
that the second requirement, that petitioners' right to the writ be
clear and indisputable, was a question of whether the district
court adequately safeguarded petitioners' interest in protecting
the documents. Id.
Following a lengthy discussion of the history of and underpinnings to the attorney-client privilege, and the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, id. at 90-9 1, Judge Aldisert considered
the district court's protection of petitioners' interest. Id. at 9194. The court found this protection to be lacking because of the
district court's consideration of evidence that was not before the
magistrate. Id. at 94. The court emphasized that under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the provision governing district court reconsideration of non-dispositive pretrial determinations (such as
discovery issues) by magistrate judges, the district court's standard of review is significantly circumscribed. Id. at 91.
Judge Aldisert explained that under § 636(b)(1)(A), the district court can only overturn findings of fact if they are clearly
erroneous. Id. The court contrasted this standard with that
which governs district court reconsideration of magistrate find-
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ings on dispositive motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B)
and 636(b)(1)(C). Id. The court emphasized that under
§§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C), the district court reviews the dispositive motions de novo, and can also " 'receive further evidence.'" Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and 636(b)(1)
(C)). The court stressed that under the clearly erroneous standard, the common law tradition does not allow a reviewing court
to consider evidence not considered in the first instance. Id. at
92. ThusJudge Aldisert concluded that in a § 636(b)(1)(A) proceeding like this one, "the district court is not permitted to receive further evidence." Id. at 91, 93.
After tracing the longstanding common law tradition of
preventing a reviewing court from considering evidence not
presented below, Judge Aldisert concluded that the district court,
in considering excerpts from the Cipollone record not presented
to the magistrate, overstepped its authority under
§ 636(b)(1)(A). Id. at 93. Judge Aldisert rejected respondent's
argument that insofar as the magistrate had examined extensive
portions of the record from Cipollone, the district court judge,
who had presided over the Cipollone trial, could properly consider
the entire record regardless of whether the magistrate had considered particular portions of it. Id. at 92-93. The judge held
that the consideration of new evidence by the district court constituted reversible error, and that petitioners had established a
clear and indisputable right to the writ of mandamus. Id. at 93.
Accordingly, the court directed that the district court's order precluding the privilege on the basis of the crime-fraud exception be
vacated. Id. at 93-94.
The court went on to discuss the legal standards to be employed in ascertaining whether the crime-fraud exception should
overcome the attorney-client or work product privileges, noting
that it chose to meet this issue because it had not previously had
an opportunity to do so. Id. at 94. Judge Aldisert agreed with
the district court that the party seeking discovery bears the burden of "present[ing] evidence which, if believed by the factfinder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements
of the crime-fraud exception were met." Id. at 95-96. Thejudge
went on to explain that an in camera review of disputed documents is justified when the party seeking discovery presents facts
which "support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that
the materials may reveal evidence of a crime or fraud." Id. at 96.
The court emphasized, however, that if this initial showing is
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made, "then a more formal procedure is required" to ensure that
the party asserting the privilege is "given the opportunity to be
heard . . . at the hearing seeking an exception to the privilege."
Id. at 96-97. Thus, the court held that when a fact finder considers whether the crime-fraud exception applies, "the party invoking the privilege has the absolute right to be heard by testimony
and argument." Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
The court further instructed that if it is determined that an
exception to the privilege does apply, then the documents implicated by the exception must not be disclosed until all avenues of
appeal have been exhausted. Id. The court stressed that by excerpting portions of the documents determined to fall within the
exception in its published opinion, the district court created a
situation in which matters still privileged had already been divulged. Id.
Finally, in what he described as an agonizing aspect of the
court's decision, Judge Aldisert considered whether the case had
to be reassigned to another district judge in order to maintain
the appearance of impartiality. Id. at 97-98. Noting that the right
to an impartial judge is fundamental to due process, the court
focused upon and quoted at length from the prologue to the district court's opinion:
In light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants, one wonders when all industries will recognize their
obligation to voluntarily disclose risks from the use of their
products. All too often in the choice between the physical
health of consumers and the financial well-being of business,
concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety, and
money over morality. Who are these persons who knowingly
and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely for
the purpose of making profits and who believe that illness and
death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own
prosperity!
As the following facts disclose, despite some rising
pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.
Id. at 97 (citing Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. at 683).
In light of this prologue, Judge Aldisert considered whether the
district court had avoided both bias and the appearance of bias. Id.
at 98. The judge stressed that reassignment is proper not only to
ensure actual impartiality, but also to preserve the appearance of
judicial neutrality. Id. (citing United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d
1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989)). The court noted that to safeguard
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impartiality and the appearance thereof, the court possesses the
"supervisory authority to order cases reassigned to another district
court judge." Id. (citing Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)).
Judge Aldisert emphasized the court's conviction that the district court judge was entirely capable of trying the case free from
any actual bias or partiality. Id. The court concluded, however, that
the appearance of impartiality test could not be satisfied because the
district court's prologue implicated "the ultimate issue to be determined by a jury," i.e., whether petitioners conspired to conceal information regarding the dangers of smoking. Id. Accordingly, the
court directed, pursuant to its supervisory authority, that the case be
assigned to another district judge who, on remand, could either reconsider the magistrate's order based solely upon the evidence
before the magistrate, or could remand the proceedings to another
magistrate for reconsideration consistent with the court of appeals'
decision. Id.
In Haines, the court clarified a number of important issues with
respect to district court review of a magistrate's findings in general
and the procedural mechanisms that apply to consideration of the
crime-fraud exception in particular. The court confusingly left open
a number of issues, however, and its several holdings should be examined individually. Its decision to reassign this case to another
district court judge must also be considered.
The panel convincingly supported its general contention that
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), district court reconsideration of
non-dispositive pretrial determinations made by magistrate judges
should be limited to the evidence considered by the magistrate
judge in the first instance. The court persuasively distinguished the
clearly erroneous standard governing these proceedings from the de
novo standard that applies to district court review of dispositive motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C), and further
buttressed its interpretation of the statute through a careful examination of the clearly erroneous standard as developed in the common law tradition.
In applying this principle to the facts in this case, however, the
court was less persuasive. Given the unusual procedural reality that
this district court judge had presided over the Cippollone trial, and
that the magistrate had examined extensive portions of the record
from that trial, the court did not convincingly set forth why the district court's consideration of the new evidence constituted reversible error entitling petitioners to a writ of mandamus. The court
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failed to explain how the district court's action in considering those
portions of the trial not examined by the magistrate compromised
petitioners' interest so thoroughly as to prove that their right to the
writ rose to the level of being "clear and indisputable." Moreover,
it is worth mentioning that the court's conclusion that the first part
of the mandamus test had been met was similarly unpersuasive.
Given that the district court ordered the disclosure of only the portions of the documents that had been quoted in its opinion, and
remanded the issue of the applicability of the crime-fraud exception
to the other documents, it is entirely unclear how the granting of the
writ provided petitioners with relief they could have secured nowhere else.
The court's clarification of the shifting burdens under the
crime-fraud exception was generally sound. The court established a
clear and realistic prima facie standard which, if met by the party
asserting the exception, will entitle the district court to conduct an
in camera review; and the court sufficiently protected the interest of
the party asserting the privilege by requiring that it have an opportunity to rebut this showing. The panel failed to provide any real
guidance, however, with respect to the standard to be employed by
the district court in determining the evidentiary showing necessary
to overcome a prima facie case that the exception applies.
The court wisely instructed that if a district court finds the
crime-fraud exception to be applicable, it must nonetheless ensure
the secrecy of the documents until all possible appeals are exhausted. Only if this procedure is followed will the interests of the
party defending the privilege be adequately protected. Nevertheless, the court failed to instruct how, as a practical matter, a district
court is to explain its conclusion that the exception applies without
some resort to the substance of the documents that it has examined
through an in camera review. In short, the court provided some necessary guidance in the difficult application of the crime-fraud exception, but left unresolved a number of important and equally difficult
questions.
In that aspect of its decision that has undoubtedly engendered
the most attention, the court opaquely and dangerously concluded
that the district court judge's prologue undermined the appearance
of impartiality so essential to our system of justice. Although the
test of what constitutes a violation of this requirement is curiously
unclear from the court's opinion, the court seems to suggest that
disqualification is proper anytime a judge's pretrial decision indicates, in strong language, that the judge holds a strong opinion re-
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garding "the ultimate issue to be determined by a jury, as fact
finders, after appropriate instructions given them by the trial
judge." 975 F.2d at 98. According to the court, the district court
judge's determination that petitioners knowingly and secretly concealed information regarding the health hazards associated with
smoking demonstrated that the judge could no longer appear to be
impartial. How the judge could have determined that the crimefraud exception applied (i.e., that the documents were discoverable
because petitioners sought the legal advice contained in the documents to aid in their ongoing fraudulent concealment of smokingrelated risks) without implicating the merits of Haines's claim is
never addressed or explained. Thus, the court's opinion provides
no meaningful standard for determining when reassignment of a
case to another judge will be proper.
Of equal importance is the court's failure to distinguish between alleged bias based upon a personal or extrajudicial source,
and alleged bias based upon the actual evidence before the judge.
Clearly, the judge's prologue was based upon the evidence then
before the court, a fact implied by the panel's conclusion that there
was no actual bias. Two commentators have described as extraordinary the panel's failure to make this distinction. See Bennett L.
Gershman, Disqualifying Judges for Bias: The Sarokin Case, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 1 (providing that "in determining whether a disqualifying appearance of partiality exists, courts make a distinction
between ajudge's conduct while on the bench and her conduct in an
extra-judicial capacity," and emphasizing that "I have found no
other case where a judge has been disqualified for an appearance of
bias for remarks contained in a judicial opinion, based on facts in
the record, and relating to the merits of the case." Professor Gersham concluded that "one comes away from this discussion with the
impression that [the] disqualification is an aberration based on undisclosed factors, or that the standards for disqualification based on
ajudge's 'appearance' are nebulous and confused."); Tracy Schroth,
Sarokin Off Tobacco Case After Circuit's Rare Move, N.J. L.J., Sept. 14,
1992, at 3 (quoting Professor Jeffrey Stempel who expressed disbelief at the court's failure to address the distinction between judicial
and extrajudicial bias).
Indeed, in reassigning the case pursuant to its supervisory
power, rather than the statute governing judicial disqualification, 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), the court avoided the issue of which sources to consider for finding judicial bias. In Waller v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2321-22 (1992), Justices White and O'Connor dissented from the
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Court's denial of certiorari, wishing to resolve the conflict among
the circuits with respect to differing interpretations of "whether the
cause of apparent partiality or bias must stem from an extrajudicial
source" for the bias to result in disqualification. Id. at 2321 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice White explained "[t]hat the First Circuit
would consider appearances of judicial bias and prejudice originating in judicial proceedings conflicts not only with the Ninth Circuit,
but also with the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits." Id. at
2322 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Regardless of the
Third Circuit's position on whether disqualification can result from
bias based upon a judicial source, the panel's failure even to mention this issue was judicially dishonest. The court's decision to reassign the case pursuant to its supervisory authority, rather than the
governing statute, is also troubling because it places such an important function within the court's unbridled discretion, and not upon
the specific findings required under the statute. Why the Third Circuit again has reassigned a case "without pausing to consider
whether there is a basis for legal disqualification" under the statute,
Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d at 789, is both inexplicable and unjustifiable. Indeed, this action implicates the separation of powers insofar
as supervisory powers are to be invoked only when no statute provides a rule, and "clearly do not allow a court to 'disregard a rule or
statute .

. . .'"

United States v. Scop, 940 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir.

1991) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 505 (1983) (declaring that supervisory power does not extend
to areas in which Congress has acted).
For these reasons, the court's decision regarding disqualification was opaque and mysterious, provided no clear guidance as to
when disqualification is required, and ignored both governing statutory authority and the fundamental distinction between judicial and
extrajudicial bias. Beyond these problems, however, is the dangerousness of the court's opinion. As Professor Gershman stated, "[i]f
the message from the Third Circuit to trial judges is to hold your
tongue, the inevitable result will be encouragement of judicial concealment." Gershman, supra, at 5. Indeed, the very reason for not
disqualifying judges when the alleged bias stems from a judicial
source is to encourage judicial forthrightness. As the district court
judge disqualified from Haines explained in subsequently voluntarily
recusing himself from Cipollone:
The issue presented to me [in Haines] required that I determine whether there was evidence of fraud and misrepresentation, and I made that determination and found that there was.
It is difficult for me to understand how a finding based upon

1993]

809

SURVEY

the evidence can have the appearance of partiality merely because it is expressed in strong terms....
I fear for the independence of the judiciary if a powerful
litigant can cause the removal of a judge for speaking the truth
based upon the evidence, in forceful language that addresses
the precise issues presented for determination.
799 F. Supp. 466, 466 (D.N.J. 1992). In light of the decision's disqualification section, and its message to the judiciary, the legal community should be fearful. Although it may seem ironic, perhaps
Congress should amend and make binding the legislation governing
the proper grounds for judicial disqualification to save the independence of the judiciary from the judiciary itself.
Paul C. Gluckow

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-ABSTENTION-FEDERAL
COURT

SHOULD

ABSTAIN

FROM

TRIAL

EXERCISING JURISDICTION

OVER ORDER ISSUED IN STATE COURT-Port Auth. Police Benevo-

lent Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey Police Dep 't,
973 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Port Authority Police Benevolent Association (PBA)
hired a fundraising organization, Trotter, to assist in the solicitation of contributions. 973 F.2d at 171. InJanuary 1991, Trotter
commenced its efforts by soliciting donations from Port Author-

ity tenants. Pursuant to the Port Authority's General Rules and
Regulations, which forbade unapproved solicitations of Port Authority tenants by Port Authority employees, the Acting Director
of the Port Authority's Public Safety Department asked the PBA
to terminate its solicitation of tenants. The PBA disregarded this
request. Id. at 171-72.
In response, the Port Authority filed a complaint against the
PBA and Trotter in the New York Supreme Court, requesting an
injunction prohibiting additional solicitations. Id. at 172. Despite the PBA's contention that the prohibition against solicitations violated its First Amendment rights, the trial court granted
the preliminary injunction against the PBA and Trotter. Id.
Subsequently, the PBA filed a notice of appeal on the preliminary injunction to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
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Court of New York. Id. Two months later the PBA also filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey seeking a temporary restraining order and an injunction against enforcement of the regulation that disallowed employee solicitations. Id. The district court denied the temporary
restraining order at a pre-trial hearing. Id. The district court
subsequently declined to exercise jurisdiction over the PBA's
complaint because doing so would interfere with the New York
state court order. Id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to exercise jurisdiction, observing that the district
court's abstention fit within an established doctrine that requires
federal courts to abstain from enjoining state civil proceedings.
Id. at 171. The Third Circuit also ruled that the district court
could have declined jurisdiction based upon a doctrine that disallows federal district courts from acting as appellate courts for
state proceedings. Id.
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Garth first summarized
the Younger doctrine, which prohibits federal courts from enjoining state criminal proceedings, and which is based upon the
principles of federalism and comity. Id. at 173 (citing Younger v.
Haris, 401 U.S. 341 (1971)). The judge then articulated the
Third Circuit's three-prong test for determining whether abstention exists. Id. (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.
1989)).
The court explained that, for a district court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction under Younger, it is first necessary that the
state court proceedings be ongoing. Id. Because the PBA and
Trotter were making identical constitutional arguments in the
district and state courts, and because the PBA's state court appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending concurrently with
its pendency of its district court complaint, Judge Garth concluded that the first requirement under the Younger doctrine had
been met. Id.
The Third Circuit then espoused the second requirement for
a district court to abstain under Younger - an adequate chance to
raise federal claims in state court. Id. Finding this element satisfied, Judge Garth maintained that the PBA and Trotter were free
to raise federal claims on appeal in New York state courts and
indeed were expected to raise such claims. Id. at 173-74.
The court turned to the remaining requirement under the
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Younger doctrine - the existence of an important state interest.
Id. at 174. Judge Garth recognized several state interests at
stake. Id. at 174-76. For example, Judge Garth examined the
ability of New York courts to effectuate their orders. Id. at 174.
The judge pronounced that, had the district court issued the requested injunction, the district court would have undercut the
state court's interlocutory order and violated principles of comity
and federalism, tenets that are foundational to the Younger doctrine. Id. at 174-75. Judge Garth stressed that all interlocutory
state court orders may not meet the "important state interest"
prong of the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. at 174-75. Nonetheless, the judge held that abstention is typically warranted
when a state court decision involves a federal question and where
the parties have the opportunity to appeal within the state system. Id. at 176.
The Third Circuit next addressed whether the issues raised
by the PBA and Trotter constituted exceptions to the Younger
doctrine. Id. The first exception to the Younger doctrine, which
the court held inapplicable, was when state court proceedings are
commenced to harass federal plaintiffs. Id. The second case in
which Younger would be inappropriate, the court related, was
when an enforced statute directly violated the Constitution, and
the federal court's failure to act would result in irreparable damage. Id. Dismissing the applicability of this exception, Judge
Garth rejected the PBA's contention that the Port Authority's
regulations were an unconstitutional prior restraint of free
speech. Id. Judge Garth noted that the right to solicit donations,
although protected speech, must be balanced against the government's interest in regulating public services. Id. (citing Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32
(1980); Rankig v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)). Observing
that supervision of these services constituted a legitimate government interest, the court concluded that the regulations did not
patently violate the Constitution. Id.
In dicta, the Third Circuit asserted that the PBA's complaint
could have also been dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which holds that lower federal courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction either to perform appellate review of state
court decisions or to analyze constitutional claims which are intermixed with state court decisions. Id. at 177 (citing District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Judge Garth reasoned
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that, because the PBA and Trotter raised the same claims before
the district court as they had raised in the New York state court, a
decision on the merits by the district court would have constituted an appellate review of the state court's decision. Id. at 178.
Citing numerous decisions, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that the doctrine is applicable only to decisions of a state's
highest court, and instead emphasized that Rooker-Feldman also
applied to lower state court orders. Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order to
dismiss. Id. at 179.
In Port Authority Police Benevolence Association, the Third Circuit
correctly affirmed the district court's decision not to accept jurisdiction over the PBA dispute. In so doing, the court exhibited
due respect to state courts and avoided a messy fight between
state and federal courts that would damage public perceptions of
the legal system. Furthermore, by using the analytical framework
of the Younger doctrine, the court did not automatically and capriciously decide that the district court had no jurisdiction over the
case. Rather, the Third Circuit properly considered whether
there was an opportunity for appellate review of the decision and
assertion of federal claims, and whether district court inaction
would irreparably damage the defendant.
Curiously, the court also asserted that the case could have
been decided solely on Rooker-Feldman grounds, perhaps indicating the Third Circuit's conviction that the district court should
have relied on Rooker-Feldman rather than Younger. This dicta was
both unnecessary and, upon reflection, disconcerting. RookerFeldman is insensitive to the legal system's hard realities, such as
the backlog of cases in the courts and the harm that the passage
of time may cause to a defendant or a plaintiff. The doctrine is
not sufficiently flexible to allow for emergencies where a person
or group may be immediately and irreparably harmed by a
court's actions. Conversely, the Younger doctrine balances these
considerations, and allows a federal court to grant relief when
such a crisis arises. It would be unfortunate if federal courts were
to be precluded from preventing such harm.
David D. Almroth
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-NEw

TRIAL-DISTRICT COURT ABUSES ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTS A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON AN

THAT IT HAD FAILED To ExTESTIMONY-Blancha v. Raymark
Indus., 972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1992).
ERRONEOUS

DETERMINATION

CLUDE IRRELEVANT EXPERT

While serving in the United States Navy and working as a
machinist at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Frank Thomas was
exposed to various asbestos products. 972 F.2d at 509. Over
twenty years later, in the summer of 1987, Thomas was diagnosed as having mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer most frequently caused by asbestos exposure. Id. Following this
diagnosis, Thomas and his wife, Sonya, filed a personal injury
action against several asbestos manufacturers, alleging that Frank
had contracted mesothelioma due to exposure to asbestos products manufactured and distributed by defendants. Id. On August
10, 1988, one year after being diagnosed with mesothelioma,
Frank Thomas died. Id.
Following Thomas's mesothelioma-related death, Edward T.
Blancha, executor of Thomas's estate, was substituted as a plaintiff. Id. at 509 n. 1. All defendants except for Keene Corporation
(Keene) settled either before trial or after the first day of trial. Id.
at 510. During trial, expert witness testimony established that
three types of asbestos existed: amosite, crocidolite, and chrysotile. Id. Plaintiffs' experts testified that exposures to all three
forms of asbestos were substantial contributing factors to
Thomas's development of mesothelioma. Id. Defendant's expert, Dr. Gee, on the other hand, testified that chrysotile asbestos
does not cause mesothelioma. Id. Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of Dr. Gee's testimony on the ground that the testimony
was irrelevant because Keene had presented no evidence that its
product contained chrysotile asbestos. Id. Overruling plaintiffs'
objection and denying plaintiffs' subsequent motion to strike, the
district court permitted the testimony to stand. Id.
In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found that
Keene's asbestos products were defective because they lacked adequate and proper warnings of the danger in the use of those
products. Id. Nevertheless, the jury concluded that the products
were not a substantial contributing factor in causing Thomas's
illness and subsequent death. Id. After the jury rendered a verdict favoring defendant Keene, plaintiffs moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
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Id. at 509, 510. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for
judgment non obstante veredicto, but granted the motion for a new
trial. Id.
In ordering a new trial, the district court held that it had
erred in admitting Dr. Gee's testimony. Id. at 510. The district
court concluded that because Keene had introduced no evidence
that its products contained chrysotile rather than another type of
asbestos, Dr. Gee's testimony was irrelevant and probably misled
the jury into believing that Keene's product contained chrysotile
asbestos and therefore could not have been the cause of
Thomas's mesothelioma. Id.
Keene subsequently moved for reconsideration of the
court's order, arguing that in granting a new trial, the district
court had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Keene.
Id. The district court denied the motion, reiterating its earlier
assertion that admission of Dr. Gee's testimony was "substantially erroneous" and very likely misled the jury. Id. at 510-11.
The trial court elaborated that the opening arguments presented
by Keene and by Owens-Illinois, originally Keene's codefendant,
combined with Dr. Gee's testimony, probably led the jury to conclude that Keene's products contained only chrysotile. Id. at 511.
Such a conclusion, according to the trial court, was unwarranted
and improper because Keene had presented no evidence concerning the contents of its products. Id. Additionally, the district
court explained that it had not shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant in granting a new trial. Id. Finally, the district court
stated that a new trial was required because the court had failed
to properly instruct the jury that there was no evidence as to the
type of asbestos produced by Keene. Id.
By stipulation of the parties, the case was retried without a
jury. Id. The original record's entire proceeding was offered
into evidence at the retrial and, based on that record, the district
court held for the plaintiffs. Id. at 509, 511. Keene then appealed the district court's grant of a new trial. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial
court order granting a new trial and reinstated the verdict
reached in the first trial. Id. at 509, 511, 518.
Writing for the Third Circuit majority, Circuit Judge Cowen
began the analysis with a detailed exegesis on the applicable standard of review for decisions granting or denying a new trial. Id.
at 512. Such a decision, explained the judge, "is confided almost
entirely to the discretion of the district court." Id. (citation omit-
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ted). Judge Cowen noted that both a district court ruling regarding relevancy of evidence and the grant of a new trial on the basis
of jury confusion are reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Id.
(citations omitted). The judge further opined that where the district court's decision was based on the application of a legal principle, plenary review is appropriate. Id. (citations omitted).
Characterizing the basis of the district court's decision to
grant a new trial as unclear, Judge Cowen posited that the district
court believed Dr. Gee's testimony to be relevant but so confusing to the jury "as to result in some sort of miscarriage of justice." Id. Postulating that the district court's conclusions were
based on the flawed legal premise that the defendant had the responsibility to present affirmative evidence regarding the content
of its products, the panel majority concluded that the order
granting a new trial must be reversed. Id. The court then elaborated on its reasoning, addressing in order three related yet distinct issues: (1) whether Dr. Gee's testimony was relevant; (2)
whether Dr. Gee's testimony, although relevant, should have
been excluded to avoid jury confusion; and (3) whether failure to
instruct the jury regarding the lack of evidence of Keene's products constituted a "miscarriage of justice" requiring a new trial.
Id. at 512-18.
First, the panel majority established that Dr. Gee's testimony
was relevant. Id. at 512-15. Noting that the present claim was
governed by substantive state tort law, the majority observed that
under Pennsylvania law the plaintiff in a products liability action
has the burden of proving that defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm alleged. Id. at 513.
The majority then described plaintiffs' theory in the case as
hinging upon proof that all types of asbestos cause mesothelioma. Id. Without such proof, the majority reasoned, the plaintiff would otherwise be required to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that Keene's products contained the specific
types of asbestos which do cause mesothelioma. Id. Stressing
that Keene's counsel, unlike counsel for codefendant Owens-Illinois, had not asserted during opening statements that Keene's
products contained only chrysotile, the panel majority proposed
that Keene's primary argument or defense was that plaintiffs had
failed to carry their burden of proof on the issue of proximate
causation. Id. The majority then proposed that Dr. Gee's testimony was relevant because it directly challenged the backbone of
plaintiffs' argument. Id. Finally, the majority concluded that the
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trial court's initial decision to allow Dr. Gee's testimony was correct, because Keene was entitled to submit expert testimony to
rebut plaintiffs' theory of causation. Id. at 514.
Judge Cowen then cited Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to
buttress its determination that Dr. Gee's testimony was germane.
Id. The judge explained that "evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. The majority
further opined that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to
prove a consequential fact." Id. (citing 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE

§ 5166, at 74 n.47 (1978)).

Next, the panel majority decisively and derisively rejected
plaintiffs' contention that Keene was required to present evidence that its products contained chrysotile in order mount a
"chrysotile defense." Id. Then the court reiterated that the relevancy of Dr. Gee's testimony did not depend upon Keene's ability to prove the chemical composition of its product. Id. at 51415. Such a proposition, wrote Judge Cowen, would impermissibly shift the burden of proof regarding proximate causation to
Keene, and require Keene to concede the element of proximate
cause unless it was willing to affirmatively prove its products did
not proximately cause Thomas's death. Id. at 515. Moreover,
maintaining that the jury could readily and reasonably choose to
disbelieve plaintiffs' experts and find that plaintiffs had failed to
sustain their burden of proving proximate cause, Judge Cowen
concluded that the district court had no basis for its finding that
the jury had been misled. Id.
The panel majority next discussed whether the jury decision
resulted from juror confusion. Id. at 515-17. Again declaring
that the legal basis for the district court's decision to admit Dr.
Gee's testimony was unclear, the panel majority theorized that a
possible rationale for the district court decision might lie with
either Federal Rule of Evidence 403, or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Id. at 515-16. Both rationales, contended the panel
majority, were erroneous. Id. at 516.
The panel majority quoted Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
which provides that evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential
for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury. Id. (quoting

FED.

R.

EVID.

403). According to the panel ma-
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jority, it would be difficult to create an exhaustive list of factors
calling for exclusion of evidence under Rule 403. Id. Conceding
that certain types of evidence are routinely excluded under the
rule, the majority nevertheless asserted that Rule 403 should be
invoked sparingly and that "[t]he balance under the rule should
be struck in favor of admissibility." Id. (citing United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. TerzadoMadruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
The panel majority further noted that, in weighing the probative value of evidence to determine admissibility under Rule
403, a court must consider the extent to which the issue which
the evidence is intended to prove was directly at issue in the case.
Id. (citing United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)). Insisting that Dr. Gee's
testimony related to proximate causation, a matter directly at issue in the case, the court first asserted that the jurors had not
been confused by Dr. Gee's testimony, and then added that any
confusion that was caused by the testimony did not substantially
outweigh the probative value of such testimony. Id.
To substantiate its claim that the jury could not have been
confused, the panel majority recounted in excruciating detail instances during the original trial wherein the jury had been cautioned that no evidence regarding the content of Keene's
products had been presented. Id. at 516-17. Again asserting that
the jury had reasonably determined that plaintiffs had not met
their burden of proof regarding causation, the panel majority
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a
new trial based on jury confusion. Id. at 517.
Finally, Judge Cowen addressed and summarily dismissed
the argument that the failure to instruct the jury as to the lack of
evidence regarding the content of Keene's products justified the
grant of a new trial. Id. The judge noted that neither party had
objected to the jury instructions but acknowledged that even in
the absence of timely objection, a trial court could properly grant
a new trial if the erroneous jury instruction resulted in a "miscarriage ofjustice." Id. Since, in the view of the panel majority, the
jury had already been appropriately apprised of the lack of evidence regarding the content of Keene's products, the court contended that there was no need for such a jury instruction. Id.
Concluding that the district court's grant of a new trial on that
basis was therefore an abuse of discretion, the panel majority reversed the district court's order granting a new trial and re-
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manded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of
defendant consistent with the jury verdict in the first trial. Id. at
518.
In a brief dissent, Judge Seitz presented a perspicacious
analysis based upon Federal Rules of Evidence 705. Id. (Seitz, J.,
dissenting). Judge Seitz proposed that the district court committed error in allowing Dr. Gee's testimony because the court had
failed to order Dr. Gee to identify the underlying facts upon
which he relied, and not because it was objectionable within the
meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 703. Id. Carefully delineating the distinction between admissible testimony that chrysotile does not cause mesothelioma and an expert's unsupported
and inadmissible statement of belief that chrysotile was used on
United States Navy ships, the judge Seitz posited that the district
court erred in allowing Dr. Gee to testify without revealing the
underlying facts or data which support his opinion, thereby improperly allowing the jury to infer that Thomas had been on
board a ship that used chrysotile. Id. Such a substantial risk of
prejudice, concluded the dissent, was sufficient to support the
district court's considerable discretion to order a new trial in order to prevent a "miscarriage ofjustice." Id.
One could characterize this case as a minor skirmish in the
ongoing asbestos litigation war - in some sense, an insignificant
tale which is part of a grand saga. Like most massive toxic tort
cases, litigants have fought the asbestos legal battle primarily on
procedural grounds. Typically, these cases have not been won
and lost based upon the merits; rather they have typically turned
on narrow procedural and evidentiary issues. See, e.g., UNR Indus.
v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
373 (1992) (asbestos manufacturers sought indemnification and
contribution from the United States government for liability to
shipyard workers exposed to asbestos; the government prevailed
on a jurisdictional issue involving interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1500 (1988)). Often, plaintiff's counsel enters the fray at a disadvantage vis-a-vis defendant's counsel, who is usually a veteran
to such actions and therefore expert in the procedural intricacies
which dominate the landscape in most large-scale tort litigations.
Meanwhile, injured plaintiffs with otherwise meritorious cases
are deprived ofjust compensation for their injuries, falling victim
to yet another booby trap in the procedural and evidentiary
minefield of mass tort litigation.
In its decision, the Third Circuit has conferred yet another
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advantage to defendant's counsel. Product liability actions, particularly those involving chemical products, are inherently complex; too often, jurors do not have the necessary scientific or
technical background to fully comprehend the myriad intricate
issues critical to plaintiff's case. In fact, a common trial tactic frequently employed by defendant's counsel is to attempt to confuse the jury, on the theory that a jury that does not understand
the plaintiff's case will decide in favor of the defendant. In jury
selection, defendant's counsel often will peremptorily challenge
scientists and engineers who might actually understand the scientific issues involved. Moreover, in their zeal to secure a favorable
outcome for their clients, counsel for defendants will sometimes
introduce expert testimony, statistical data, and other marginally
relevant evidence to overwhelm and fluster an easily baffled jury.
A trial court is in the best position to determine whether a
jury has been confused by expert testimony; the oft-quoted aphorism that an appellate court suffers a disadvantage from viewing
only the bare, "cold record" rings especially true in the circumstances of the present case. Although purporting to apply a standard of review based upon clear abuse of discretion, the Blancha
court in reality exercised de novo review; not one iota of deference was shown to the district court or its findings. Now, at least
in the Third Circuit, defendant's counsel essentially will have free
rein to obfuscate and confuse a jury already muddled by perplexing issues. Under the standard established in Blancha, if the trial
court realizes that the jury was confused and grants a new trial,
defendant's counsel can easily secure a reversal by convincing the
appellate panel to displace the trial court's sound judgment with
the appellate court's perceptions and beliefs.
Peter Tu

